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If we ever owned the land, we still own it, for we never sold it. In the treaty councils, the
commissioners have claimed that our country had been sold to the government. Suppose a white
man should come to me and say, ‘Joseph, I like your horses, and I want to buy them.’ Then he
goes to my neighbor and says to him, ‘Joseph’s horses, I want to buy them, but he refuses to
sell.’ My neighbor answers, ‘Pay me the money, and I will sell you Joseph’s horses.’ The white
man returns to me and says, ‘Joseph, I have bought your horses, and you must let me have them.’
If we sold our lands to the government, this is the way they were bought.

-Native America Chief Hin-mah-too-yah-lat-kekt Joseph (1840-1904)
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List of Terms
ASK

Agricultural Society of Kenya

CID

Criminal Investigation Department

CSO

Civic Service Organization

CSR

Corporate Social Responsibility
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General Service Unit
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Kwale Sugar Cane Company Ltd.

Kitu Kidogo

Small payments made to access or expedite services; a bribe
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Mzee

Elder; used to express respect and status

Outgrower

A contracted farmer whose crops are sold and processed by a company

PC

Provincial Commissioner

SDF

Sugar Development Fund

Shamba

pl. mashamba; farm
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Abstract
This paper presents a report of the findings from a four-week study on the varying
perspectives towards Kwale International Sugar Co. Ltd. which have brought about problems
concerning land, development, and politics. It discusses findings fromliterary sources and field
work, including correspondence, interviews, forums, and focus group discussions with
government representatives, company managers, and community members. It highlights where
recorded information is inconsistent, making it difficult for the people and company to coexist.
Additionally, it describes how the community’s grievances developed and critiques the various
actors and actions that are responsible. Lastly, it provides recommendations to a way forward
towards cooperation and development.
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Introduction
At the Berlin Conference in 1885, European powers divided the African continent
amongst themselves, focusing on the enormous profit potential of the continent’s land and
natural resources. During this conference, Kenya became a part of the British Colonial Empire,
on which the sun never set. The colonial era in Kenya inspired land issues and conflict between
the colonial administration and the native people. As colonial settlers obtained large tracts of
Kenya’s most agriculturally productive land, Kenyan natives became increasingly less selfsufficient in food production. The land grabbed by the settlers was known as the “White
Highlands,” where cash crops grew on an industrial scale previously unknown to Kenya.While
Kenyan agricultural products began entering global trade networks, colonial policies prevented
Kenyan natives from accessing profitable agricultural markets (Jama).
Today, after nearly 50 years of independence, these issues are still politically explosive as
African elites and corporate investors replace bygone colonial administrators. Kenyan natives
continue to lack access to profitable markets while leaders work alongside investors for personal
gains that do nothing to benefit the people on-the-ground. Some sub-sectors of the larger
Kenyan agricultural sector have crucial political significance and large potential for profit,
making them strategic yet contentious industries. Kenya’s sugar sub-sector is one example of
such industry, with a past of injustices persisting into a future of conflict (Jama).

Background
The history of Kenya’s sugar sub-sector dates back to the colonial era. During the
firstyears of Britain’s colonial rule in Kenya, the colonial administration brought laborers from
India to build a railway from Mombasa to Uganda. Once completing the railway, many of these
7

laborers remained in Kenya, establishing businesses and eventually entering Kenya’s
commercial agriculture industry. In 1922, the Hindocha family opened the first commercial
sugar factory in Kenya, the Miwani Sugar Mills, in Kisumu. Just five years later, Associated
Sugar Company Ltd. established Kenya’s second sugar factory in Ramisi. The Madhvani Group
International of India privately owned and managed the Ramisi sugar factory while local Indians
owned the large-scale farms, which exclusively supplied the factory with sugar cane until the
1960s when new policies1 made it possible for the company to process sugar cane from smallscale, native farmers through a practice termed “outgrowing” (Wanyande).
Soon after Kenya’s independence, the post-colonial government began to push towards
creating a self-sufficient sugar producing country as a part of the nationwide agricultural
revolution. In 1966, the Government of Kenya opened its first sugar producing factory, the
Muhoroni Sugar Factory, followed by Chemelil Sugar factory (1968), Mumias (1973), Nzola
(1978) and SONY (1979) (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola, 10). While boosting the economy
through rural development and by providing both direct and indirect employment, the expansion
of the sugar sub-sector in Kenya also served the Government by lowering production costs,
making Kenya’s sugar sub-sector globally competitive. By opening five government owned
sugar factories, the Government hoped to produce enough sugar to supply the domestic demand
and export to the world market. This initiative convinced the public that the Government was

1

One of these policies is the Swynnerton Plan of 1954, creating, for the first time, an individual
land tenure system. Prior to the Swynnerton Plan, land was communally owned, preventing the
native people from cultivating crops for profit. The other policy that affected development of the
sugar sub-sector was the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, which made it possible for foreign
investments to enter the domestic economy. With foreign investments and management in the
sugar sub-sector, foreign actors began to gain an upper hand on the native people of Kenya
(Wanyande).
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working towards a prosperous and self-sufficient Kenya, promised by Nationalists during the
struggle for independence (Wanyande).
Although Kenya’s sugar sub-sector grew through post-colonial governmental expansion,
the industry faced a crisis towards the end of the 20th century. Causes of this crisis include
mismanagement of factories, rising debt, outdated production technologies, poor cane quality,
and instability of global prices, to name a few (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola). The result was an
overall decline in sugar production, eluding the national interest of becoming a self-sufficient
sugar producer. Kenya’s sugar production fell from its highest estimate at 446,000 tonnes in
1989 to 330,000 tonnes in 1994, failing to meet the domestic demand, which rose from 328,000
tonnes in 1982 to 560,000 tonnes in 1995 and causing the Government of Kenya to look for new
ways to boost its sugar sub-sector (Wanyande 131).
As a result of the sugar sub-sector crisis, factories that had been established since
independence faced great challenges while the two privately owned sugar factories from the
colonial era, the Miwani Sugar Mills and the Ramisi sugar factory, collapsed. Specifically, in
the case of the Ramisi sugar factory, the private owners and managers, the Madhvani Group
International of India, abandoned the factory in 1988 to relocate to Uganda (Kwale-Group).
Along with a lease of 45,000 acres of land in Kwale County, the Madhvani Group left behind a
Ksh66 million loan from the Bank of India (Chebosi). When the owners of Ramisi sugar factory
defaulted on repayment, the bank acquired the lease as collateral on the loan that had appreciated
to Ksh0.8 billion (Ruga). In the meantime, local people scrapped down the Ramisi sugar factory
and resettled on the land of their ancestors, planting farms and building houses (Ruga).
Eighteen years later, in 2006, the Government of Kenya, seeing an opportunity to save
the sugar sub-sector, identified and approved new investors, interested in reviving the Ramisi
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sugar factory. The Government paid off the debt incurred by the Madhvani Group, acquiring the
land and re-leasing 15,000 acres of the original 45,000 to Kwale International Sugar Company
Limited, better known as KISCOL (“President Kibaki opens Mombasa show, announces the
revival of Ramisi sugar factory”). After acquiring the lease, KISCOL completed the necessary
financial and licensing procedures and planted the first generation of sugar cane in 2009.
Meanwhile, the Government has been responsible for clearing the land by resettling the people
who moved there when the Ramisi sugar factory collapsed (Chebosi).
Resettlement is the biggest obstacle to KISCOL’s progress. The company has depended
on the Government to fulfill its duties to resettle and compensate the communities on the leased
land, and, while the Government claims to have procedurally done so, many communities still
occupy the land. Thus, KISCOL and the community constantly clash as both parties contend for
their rights to the same land (Chebosi).
Currently, three community leaders, Suleman Bakari Shauri, Mwnyihamisi Chembea,
and Said Omari Mwitu, are waiting to be tried in court on the 7th of December. They were
arrested as arson suspects for the fires which occurred on Sunday, November 13th, 2011 (Otieno).
Police arrested the elder Suleman Bakari Shauri at his home in Msambweni on the morning of
Monday, November 14th and took him to Diani Police Station for interrogations. Later that day,
when Mwnyihamisi Chembea and Said Omari Mwitu visited Mzee2 at the Diani Police Station,
the two were arrested as accomplice suspects. During the subsequent week, the three suspects
were seen in Kwale court, and bail was set at Ksh2 million per suspect. Bail was paid to the
county on bond, and the three were released on the provision that they would not hold any
discussions or meetings with the community (Chimweri).

2

Kiswahili for “elder,” used to express respect and status
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Altogether, 13 acres of KISCOL sugar cane had been destroyed by fire. Eight of these
acres are located in Gonjora, with destruction and loss costing Ksh8.6 million. The other five
acres are located in Nyumba Sita, with crop loss costing Ksh3.6 million and an addition Ksh1
million cost for the destruction of irrigations pipes (Chimweri). Once sugar cane burns, it
becomes worthless, making fire the single worst enemy of sugar cane (Patrick).
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Setting
This study concerns the people and land in Msambweni District located in Kwale County,
Coast Province, Kenya. A majority of the population in Msambweni Districtis Muslim and
belongs to the Mijikenda Digo tribe. Archeological evidence of the Mijikenda places them along
Kenya’s southern coast since the 9th century (Tinga)3. There are 90,995 people living within
Msambweni Division’s 3,235 square kilometers, creating a population density of 170 that is
expected to increase to 191 by 2012 (“Msambweni District Development Plan 2008-2012”).
A variety of factors have led to a poverty rate of 61% in Msambweni District, compared
to Kenya’s national poverty statistic of 45.9%, recorded in 2005 (“Kenya Data”). This
discrepancy can be attributed to the district’s poor infrastructure such as roads, electricity,
telecommunication, and water. The only tar-matted road in the district is the A-14, going from
Mombasa to the Tanzanian boarder. While electricity is common along the A-14, access to
power becomes increasingly limited in further villages. The district has had low agricultural
production due to floods, drought, wildlife conflict, and land tenure problems. As a consequence
of the district’s undeveloped infrastructure and failing economy, there are low levels of
education, poor health services, and common food insecurity (“Msambweni District
Development Plan 2008-2012”). .
Despite the district’s agricultural struggles, listed above, farming continues to make up
two-thirds of Msambweni’s economy, producing food crops such as maize, rice, cassava,
cowpeas, sweet potatoes, coconuts, citrus, and cashew nuts. Thus Msambweni’s agricultural

3

European explorer, Thomas Spear, reports that the Mijikenda began migrating to coastal Kenya
in the 16th century. Thus, the actual date of the Mijikenda migration to coastal Kenya is debated
between historians and archaeologist; however it is important to note that their settlements in
coastal Kenya are central to their tribal and ancestral identity (Tinga).
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industry accounts for 80.6% of household incomes and employs 114,915 people. Unfortunately,
only 70% of the district’s farmers hold title deeds to their farm land causing economic insecurity.
Land issues are a problem for the district in general (“Msambweni District Development Plan
2008-2012”). Unrecognized cultural beliefs about land acquisition, absentee land owners, and a
lack of civic education concerning land rights contribute to a commonlack of title deeds along
with the entirety of Kenya’s coast. In the Coast Province, only 29% of the population has title
deeds and 11% has letters of allotment4. This leaves 60% of the population being landless
squatters5 often on the only land that they have ever known (Nyanje).

4

A document that allows the holder to apply for a title deed. The holder must apply for the title
deed and the request must be processed by the Ministry of Lands within 90 days. If the 90 day
period expires before a title deed is issued, the letter of allotment becomes null (Jaramba, 21
Nov. 2011).
5
The people who have settled on land that is owned by another individual or institution through
the possession of a title deed (“Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy”)
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Methodology
The methodology for this research includes both archival review and field work.
Beginning with an archival review, information about historical events and past reports
established the background information for this paper. In conducting field work, a snowball
sampling technique was utilized, starting with interviews of CSO representatives and continuing
from there to interview community members, government representatives, and company
managers. Altogether, a series of eight community member interviews were conducted along
with one focus group discussion with five community leaders and one forum in which about 40
community members were present. Two government representatives, one active and one retired,
were interviewed. And two company interviews, one formal and one informal, were conducted
while touring the company’s plantation and office premises. These interviews contributed to
developing the varying perspectives of the involved actors.
All interviews focused on similar questions. These questions pertained to the following
topics: how KISCOL came to Msambweni, who benefits from KISCOL, how KISCOL and the
Government communicate with the community, how the community was resettled, and how the
current conflict came about. While these topics were approached through different methods6 in
each interview, they provided this paper with the essential information from which
recommendations were made and conclusions drawn.

6

For example, when interviewing the former Msambweni MP, Abdallah Ngozi, questions were
framed around development, refraining from referencing KISCOL until Mr. Ngozi brought up
the company himself. This was done in order to prevent the assumption of the interviewee’s
biases and encourage the interviewee to share his personal view of KISCOL.
14

Discussion
The Perspectives
The land battle that resulted from the revival of the sugar factory in Msambweni involves
two key actors, the KISCOL and the local community, both of which believe they have
legitimate rights to the contested land. The battle also includes the Government in the form of
agencies and individuals whom are involved with the sugar sub-sector, land management, and
development projects. Lastly, it involves Civil Service Organizations (CSOs) due to their
support of the local community. Each of these actors has adifferent perspective, causing each to
form inconsistent opinions regarding KISCOL’s activities in Msambweni. The following
sections depict each actor’s perspective. Where discrepancies exist in this paper between each
section, discrepancies exist in reality between each of the actors.

The Company
KISCOL was established in 2006 after investors from Nairobi were identified to revive
the sugar factory in Ramisi. Later joined by others from Mauritius and Japan, these investors
came with the plan to produce 3,000 tonnes of cane per day (TCD), 18 megawatts of power, and
30,000 liters of ethanol per day before the end of 2012. In order to achieve these high
expectations, the investors brought in experts in agriculture, irrigation, and sugar cultivation
from around the world to operate and establish KISCOL in Msambweni. These experts are
responsible for creating a domestically and globally competitive sugar cane company by
lowering the cost of production and increasing efficiency (Chebosi).

15

KISCOL’s Advantage:
While the majority of Kenya’s sugar companies are located in Western Kenya, sugar
cultivation experts found KISCOL’s coastal location to be an advantage for production yields.
For example, the low altitude of the coast causes sugar cane to mature in just 1 year, which is
half of the time it takes inWestern Kenyan plantations. Additionally, improvements in sugar
yields through select sugar cane varieties allows KISCOL to produce 120 tonnes of sugar per
hector of sugar cane, whereas western plantations produce just 60 tonnes per hector. Thus, just
one hector of sugar cane at KISCOL is projected to produce four to five times as much sugar as
plantations in Western Kenya (Chebosi).
Improvements in agricultural technologies ensure this competitive advantage. For one,
KISCOL plantations feature sub-surface drip irrigation systems, the first of its kind in Kenya.
With sub-surface drip irritation, KISCOL efficiently utilize the water that it accesses from local
Karamoja dam, boreholes, and the soon-to-be-completed company-made dam, saving 60% more
water than traditional above-ground irrigation systems. Furthermore, with large investments in
factory and plantation machinery, KISCOL will be in the position to supply the domestic
demand for sugar and, additionally, export sugar and sugar byproducts to increase company
revenue (Chebosi).
Currently, KISCOL is in the multiplying phase. Having started with ten hectors from 100
tonnes of sugar cane seedling from Western Kenya and expanding first to 100 hectors then to
1,000 hectors, the plantation will soon reach its full capacity. At the same time, the company is
coming close to completing its onsite dam and finalizing government approval for drilling the
remaining 26 of the 37 proposed boreholes. Thus, KISCOL is on schedule to begin constructing
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its three-in-one sugar, power, and ethanol factory at the start of 2012 and begin crushing sugar
cane by the year’s end (Chebosi).

The Lease Contract:
When the leasing documents handed over 15,000 acres of Ramisi sugar factory’s 45,000
acres to the company, the Government of Kenya and KISCOL entered into a binding contract.
On one side, the lease requires that KISCOL create employment opportunities and decrease the
domestic sugar shortfall7. Additionally, the Government is to receive shares of company stock
even though KISCOL is a privately owned company. To uphold its side of the binding contract,
the Government is responsible for making political and physical space for KISCOL to conduct
business easily and profitably (Chebosi).
Keeping its side of the contract, KISCOL already provides 650 jobs (Kwale-Group).
This number will increase when the factory opens, creating in all 1,500 agricultural jobs and
1,000 jobs at the factory. KISCOL’s hiring strategy for its direct employees emphasizes that
locals be considered first with a focus on gender equality due to the view that Msambweni’s
Muslim traditions withhold women from the right to be “seen or heard” (Chebosi). In addition to
these direct job opportunities, there are already over 200 indirect and temporary jobs, due to
contracted services regarding projects in transportation and construction. As more capital enters
the system, the local economy also has the potential to grow and benefit from KISCOL’s
activities, opening opportunities to start businesses, shops, and restaurants (Chebosi).
Lastly, local farmers have the opportunity to register with KISCOL as outgrowers,
growing sugar cane on their own privately owned land and selling the cane to the company to be

7

Currently, Kenya has a domestic demand of 750,000 tonnes of sugar per year while domestic
production is only 500,000 tonnes of sugar per year. Thus, Kenya has become dependent upon
sugar imports to satisfy a sugar shortfall of 250,000 tonnes (Chebosi).
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crushed and processed. For legal and logistical reasons, farmers must hold a title deed to their
mashamba8 and live within a 40 kilometers radius of the KISCOL factory in order to qualify for
outgrowing. At the start of production, KISCOL expects to have around 2,000 acres of
outgrower sugar cane with aims of increasing outgrower capacity until outgrowers are
contributing 50% of cane. As an outgrower, a farmer is provided with all of the seed, machinery,
and fertilizers to begin growing cane. Once the first harvest is brought and sold to the company,
the farmer begins to pay back the loans incurred fromstart-up services. Currently, around 700
outgrowers have already applied; however, they will not be accepted until their properties
areassessed and additional expenses, such as the number of trees that must be uprooted, are taken
into consideration (Chebosi).
Beyond employment, KISCOL has a Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR, to contribute
to the development of the community in which it operates. To fulfill this responsibility,
KISCOL plans to contribute to development projects, such as the building of local schools,
health facilities, road networks, and rural electrification. KISCOL has already built football
playing fields at Msambweni Medical Training Center and plans to build more, aiming to
someday establish a company football club. Such efforts will improve the social status of
KISCOL while creating a sense of community ownership of the company (Chebosi).
Although KISCOL has plans of developing the infrastructure and boosting the local
economy, the company continues to clash with the local community. These clashes result from
the Government failing to uphold it side of the leasing contract. The Government was given the
duty of resettling the people who occupied the leased land; however, five years later, the process
of resettlement has not been completed. Additionally, the Government illegally double leased

8

Kiswahili for “farms”
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2,300 acres to both KISCOL and Tiomin Ltd.9 (“Sugar And Mining Firms in Row Over Land”).
Thus, the biggest obstacle that KISCOL faces in remaining on schedule for production is
accessing the land that the Government leased.

The Fire:
During a personal tour of the KISCOL plantation, KISCOL Agricultural Manager, Mr.
Patrick Chebosi, pointed out the eight acres in Gonjora that had been burnt down during the
previous week. Mr. Chebosi claimed that the fire was caused by an “accident;” however, after
returning to the KISCOL offices in Ramisi, a company manager, named Patrick, commented
further on the burnt cane. Patrick referred to the fire as a social problem resulting from “local
people with match boxes.”

The Community
The community affected by the revival of the sugar cane factory is located within the
Msambweni Division of Kwale County’s Msambweni District. Since KISCOL’s arrival in
Msambweni, this community has joined the category of landless squatters that makes up 60% of
the Coast Province (Nyanje). Altogether, there are 17 villages10 that have been designated for
relocation (Jaramba, “Activity: Visit to Kwale International Sugar Company (KISCOL) RamisiMsambweni District”). Although all 17 villages have ancestral ties to the land that go back to
the pre-colonial era, only some have occupied the land uninterruptedly throughout the colonial

9

Tiomin Ltd. was a titanium mining company located in Kwale that has since been bought by
new owners, BASE Titanium Ltd.
10
Nyumba Sita, Vidziyani, Gonjora, Vumbu, Fingirika, Dzibwage, Vingujini, Sawa Sawa,
Marigiza, Chibiga, Mabatani, Faamuni, Chimgede, Milalani, Bomani, Kingwede and Vidungeni
(Jaramba, “Activity: Visit to Kwale International Sugar Company (KISCOL) Ramisi-Msambweni
District”).
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and post-colonial periods as their land was leased to but unused by the Ramisi sugar factory.
Thus, these villages have developed the perception of land ownership due to their continual
occupation of their ancestral land. Now that KISCOL has mapped out a different plantation plan
than the one that was implemented by Ramisi sugar factory, these villageshave, for the first time,
been told that their land belongs to someone else and that they must leave (Ruga). The other
villages were reestablished after the collapse of the Ramisi sugar factor, believing that the
company would not be coming back. As the Ramisi sugar factory land lease grew closer to its
expiration in 2013, these villages began to believe that the land would soon be returned to them,
planting long-term crops such as mango and coconut trees and constructing permanent
homesteads (Chimweri).

Eviction:
As the Government prepared to make the land available for KISCOL’s use, numerous
cases surfaced where General Service Units (GSUs)11 and KISCOL employees used coercion
and violence to force people from their homes and farms without prior notice or warning.
Security personnel, police, and provincial administration are commonly associated with the
intimidation, harassment, and assault of the local community (Barroh).
Creating over 800 landless, possession-less, and grieving people, the raid of Nyumba Sita
village has been an especially salient event for the affected communities (“800 Left Homeless As
Firm Destroys Houses”). In 2008, GSU and KISCOL employees came to the village at 4:00
a.m., setting houses on fire, beating the community members with guns, and taking their
household belongings and livestock. The community members claim that they were uninformed
of the eviction and were taken by surprise by the force used (Msambweni Community

11

Armed Kenyan paramilitary officers (Barroh)
20

Representatives). Thus, the eviction of local communities has been criticized as un-procedural
and, furthermore, illegal (Barroh).
Local farmers also grieve the manner in which KISCOL tractors took down their
mashamba, uprooting trees, such as mango, coconut, and cashew, without any compensation for
their value (Jaramba, “Activity: Visit to Kwale International Sugar Company (KISCOL) RamisiMsambweni District”). Without a shamba to raise crops for consumption and profit, many of
these farmers have been unable to support their families. In Bodo village, many farmers who
were evicted in 2007 were unwarned and uncompensated when these tractors came to their
mashamba. Some of these farmers had homes near their mashamba but outside of the KISCOL
lease. Thus, they have continued living in their homes but no longer have any land to cultivate
and supply their need for food and money. Of the eight Bodo farmers interviewed, only one had
found employment with KISCOL while one other had opened a small local restaurant. All
interviewees claimed to be making less money than they did as farmers, citing consequential
challenges of supporting their families’ food, education, and health expenses.

Grievances:
These contentious issues have caused the local community to view KISCOL as a
deliverer of poverty and an obstacle to development. The community feels that its land rights
were violated when the Government released the land of their ancestors, without compensating
or even considering the people living and relying on the land.
Additionally, the community is rejecting KISCOL employment as it will not provide
them a means to the lifestyle that was taken from them. This was especially a worry for one
female KISCOL employee living in Bodo Village. The salary of Ksh170 per twelve hour work
day was not enough to support her and her six children, let alone cover the costs of the medical
21

expenses from a road accident, where her and 77 other KISCOL workers were injured while in a
company lorry on the way to work (KISCOL Employee from Bodo Village, 16 Nov. 2011).
Although the company has since recovered its image by contacting the injured employees and
offering compensations for medical expenses, there remains an overall community consensus
that KISCOL employment is undesirable, exposing employees to long hours of hard labor for
meager pay (KISCOL Employee from Bodo Village, 22 Nov. 2011). When a kilogram of sugar
costs between Ksh200 and Ksh24012 at the local market, a salary of Ksh170 per day offers
evicted farmers no hope for overcoming the financial and social burdens they face. As the local
community sees it, the only way for them to benefit from company employment is through an
outgrowing and factory processing partnership. However, this situation grows increasingly ideal
and elusive, as many farmers in Msambweni have no land title to a shamba on which they may
grow sugar cane as outgrowers (Chimweri).
There is also a growing sentiment amongst community members that government
agencies and individuals have been more supportive towards the company than the local people.
This sentiment was reinforced when community leaders went to court, attempting to hold the
state accountable for recognizing the community’s rights by issuing a court order, stopping all
KISCOL activities. Even after issuing the court order, the order’s provisions have not stopped
the Government from clearing the land and the company from planting its crops (Chimweri).
In a focus group discussion, three community leaders shared their views concerning the
politics behind this battle against KISCOL. For one, the Government failed to uphold procedure
by not informing, compensating or resettling the local community when the land was re-leased to
KISCOL. Instead, the community was “chased like dogs” from their ancestral land, often
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resettling themselves amongst neighboring villages (Chimweri). Amongst some community
members, it is believed that their land that was forcefully taken was never leased to KISCOL.
These communities think their land was cleared in order to be acquired by local politicians who
have only personal gain in mind (Chimweri).
The landlessness in Msambweni is often been referenced as the result of politics.The
Msambweni MP during KISCOL’s planning phase, Abdallah Ngozi, encouraged KISCOL to
establish its plantation completely within the Msambweni Division of Msambweni District. This
left the other divisions, including the division where Mr. Ngozi comes from, Lunga-Lunga,
untouched by KISCOL. The result was a lack of available land in Msambweni Division, causing
the community to have to relocate to further divisions in order to find land to become farmers or
outgrowers. Thus, the community believes that its grievances come from schemes in which local
politicians and individuals within the government have found ways to profit from their
misfortune (Chimweri).
Even though the company came to Msambweni to use the land for sugar revenue and the
people for cheap labor, the community feels that the Government is responsible for their
grievances, failing to fulfill its duty of upholding the rights and protecting the interests of its
people. In a forum, hosted by Msambweni Human Rights Watch (MHRW), MHRW Chairman,
Mahmoud Barroh, asked the audience of around 40 community representatives whether KISCOL
“manufactures sugar or poverty?” (Msambweni Community Representatives). The
overwhelming response was that KISCOL has brought poverty to the local community. There
was aunanimous sentiment amongst the community representatives that they had been
marginalized by both KISCOL and the Government of Kenya. Thus, with central government
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and local government representatives failing to stand up for the community’s grievances, the
community feels as though its rights have been violated in a losing battle.

The Fire:
During an interview with the Chairman of Kwale Human Rights Network (KHRN),
Mahmoud Barroh, on November 14th, Mr. Barroh explained that Mzee Suleman Bakari Shauri
had just been arrested that morning as an arson suspect for the KISCOL fires the previous day.
Mzee was an outspoken community leader and, thus, targeted by the Government and company
due to his respected position. Most community members refrained from visiting Mzee while he
was held in Diani Police Station in fear that they too would be suspected for arson, and, as
expected, when community leaders, Mwnyihamisi Chembea and Said Omari Mwitu, went to
visit Mzee later that evening, they too were arrested (Chimweri).
When bail was set at Ksh2 million per person, the suspects and their legal representatives
grew certain that they were framed for the arson. Not only was the bail extremely high, but it
also included an unjust provision that prohibited the suspects from holding discussions or
meetings with other community members. The three suspects believed that the Provincial
Commission (PC) and Administration were strategically prosecuting them as a way to divert the
community’s battle against KISCOL’s acquisition of their villages. If the three are found guilty
in the court trial that will begin next month, the community will have to focus on paying for the
damages caused by the fire instead of resisting KISCOL. This will divert the community’s battle
against KISCOL, giving the company the time it needs to begin production on schedule
(Chimweri).
When considering the details of the fire and their arrests, it becomes obvious to the
arrested suspects that political leaders were involved. For one, there was an inconsistency in
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arson prosecution. On the day following the KISCOL fire, local community members attempted
to prosecute the KISCOL employees who evicted people by setting a local village onfire on
Monday, November 14th. However, when the case was reported, no regards were paid to the
villagers’ allegations. Instead, villagers were told that they were the ones who burnt down their
own homes. Furthermore, the arrested community members found it peculiar that the fire
brigades responded so quickly to the sugar cane fires in Gonjora and Nyumba Sita but failed to
respond to the village fire. These questionable instances place the community in a compromised
position in which it must defend itself against politically engineered allegations rather than
fighting for the rights it has been denied (Chimweri).

The Government
The political and strategic role of sugar, as a commodity, is commonly overshadowed,
but in countries, like Kenya, where sugar production fails to meet domestic demand, sugar has
become deeply politicized. Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, the Government has been at
the forefront of developing the nation’s sugar sub-sector. Not only does the Government aim to
become a self-sufficient sugar producing nation but, also, the Government of Kenya desires to
become a sugar exporter. Yet, with costs of production higher than regional producers13,
Kenya’s sugar sub-sector has not been able to stand up to world market prices14 and compete
with cheap sugar imports. These problems contributed to the sugar sub-sector crisis of the
1990s. Thus, for over a decade, politicians have been leading a movement towards the revival of
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In 2003, the total cost of producing one ton of sugar in Kenya was $600USD, while countries
such as Swaziland and Sudan were producing sugar for $265.5USD and $230USD, respectively
(Odek, Kegode, and Ochola 39).
14
Kenya’s domestic market price for ton of sugar was $600USD in 2003, while the world market
price was $125USD (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola, 40).
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Kenya’s sugar sub-sector, hoping to improve Kenya’s strategic position within the world market
(Odek, Kegode, and Ochola).

Policies and Actions:
When the sugar sub-sector went into a crisis, the Government of Kenya established the
Sugar Development Fund (SDF) to provide loans to sugar factories, using the revenues to
rehabilitate and expand the sugar sub-sector. However, the SDF failed to outline a thorough
process of recovering these loans and their interest, making the fund ultimately unsustainable.
Later, the Sugar Act of 2001 established the Kenya Sugar Board (KSB) as a regulatory body of
the sugar sub-sector (Odek, Kegode, and Ochola). The KSB was tasked with coordinating the
various actors within the sub-sector and facilitating access to Government provided benefits and
resources. Additionally, the KSB is responsible for creating a globally competitive sugar subsector in Kenya, controlling sugar imports and exports, and ensuring that the sugar sub-sector
contributes to Kenya’s overall socio-economic development (Kenya Sugar Board). Since the
establishment of the KSB, the SDF has been increased from Ksh200 million in 2002 to Ksh3.1
billion in 2007 in hopes of further enhancing development of the sugar sub-sector (“Construction
of Sh10bn Sugar Factory Starts”). Throughout its efforts, the KSB has yet to decrease the
domestic sugar shortfall and overcome international competition.
As these government policies and agencies failed to improve Kenya’s sugar sub-sector,
Msambweni Member of Parliament, MP Abdallah Ngozi, began searching for a way to bring
sugar production back to Msambweni. During an interview conducted at Mr. Ngozi’s year old
all-inclusive motel, petroleum station, restaurant, and conference center, the former MP claimed
to pioneer the revival of the Ramisi sugar factory by finding its first investors in Nairobi. Once
the investors were identified, the idea was brought to the Central Government, who quickly
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approved of the sugar factory with hopes of rehabilitating and expanding Kenya’s sugar subsector.
On August 30, 2007, President Mwai Kibaki announced the revival of the Ramisi sugar
factory at the 2007 Agricultural Society of Kenya’s (ASK) Mombasa International Show,
claiming that the factory would efficiently utilize the regions’ agricultural potential (“President
Kibaki opens Mombasa show, announces the revival of Ramisi sugar factory”). The factory
would cost Ksh10 billion15 and eventually produce 250,000 metric tonnes of sugar per year and
create 15,000 new jobs (“Kibaki Sets Stage for Sugar Factory Revival”). 15,000 of Ramisi sugar
factory’s 45,000 acres were leased to KISCOL to revive the old sugar cane plantation while the
remaining 30,000 acres were to be used for the resettlement of squatters who had illegally moved
onto the Ramisi land after the factory had collapsed (Ruga).

Resettlement:
In the government resettlement deal, land was to be given as compensation to each
squatter household. First, a committee was established to identify the squatters. Initially 4,300
squatters were identified; however, this number decreased when the committee finalized this
group by removing those who had pretended to be squatters on the land and those whose
mashamba lay within the KISCOL lease while their household remained outside, on community
or privately owned land. Once the final group was identified, the committee held a public
meeting to announce the names of squatters who qualified for compensation. Letters of
allotment were then issued for 5.5 acres of land. Three of these 5.5 acres were for the cultivation
of sugar cane as outgrowers, two acres were for farmers to grow crops for sustenance and
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Since President Kibaki first announced the revival of the sugar factory in Kwale, this figure has
increased. It is now estimated that the factory will cost Ksh24bn by the time the factory is
constructed and functioning at full capacity (“Ramisi’s Revival Sweetens Economy”).
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surplus, and the farmers’ houses were to be built on the remaining 0.5 acre. However, because
letters of allotment often required that farmers move to villages far away, many farmers decided
to sell their letters to willing buyers for as low as Ksh5,000 per acre. Thus, many farmers
continue to be landless squatters (Ruga).
According to one Msambweni counselor16, Mshenga Ruga, only 30% of the local
community felt badly about KISCOL and the Resettlement. Most people were pleased because it
meant that the local economy would grow. Additionally, due to KISCOL’s CSR, the company
will be contributing to the community’s development. According to Mr. Ruga, it is up to the
community to make request for development funds. For example, if the community feels that
there is need for a new school, the community can submit a request to the KISCOL social
management who will review the request. If the request is approved, company funding and
support will be granted to build a new school.
Mr. Ruga added that, despite KISCOL’s contributions to community development, it is
ultimately up to the community to stop “expecting people to come from heaven and provide
everything that they need.” For instance, there are large privately owned lots of land nearby Mr.
Ruga’s house in Bodo village that have remained unused even though local villagers claim to
have nowhere to farm. From Mr. Ruga’s perspective, these villagers, living in their clustered
villages adjacent to the unused land, must put aside their laziness and begin farming again.
Not only does Mr. Ruga request that the community to “stop being lazy” but, also, he
denies all community accusations that local politicians have manipulated the situation for their
personal gain. Mr. Ruga claims that the only reason the community believes that political
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As a Msambweni counselor, Mr. Ruga represents 13-14 villages in the Kwale County
Assembly. Mr. Ruga is currently serving his second term, having held his position for the past
10 years after previously service as County Mayor for four years.
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leaders have schemed to take land is because of rumors. MPs, who served prior to Abdallah
Ngozi and failed to revive the Ramisi sugar factory, are said to be the source of these rumors,
propagating anti-development amongst the local community because they felt defeated.
To explain the contested land acquisition, Mr. Ruga points to problems that occurred
during the leasing process. The Government and investors failed to visit Msambweni when
identifying which 15,000 acres KISCOL would receive from the larger 45,000 acres that
belonged to the Ramisi sugar factory. And because Ramisi sugar factory had only utilized a
portion of 45,000 acres that it had been leased, the Government and investors were unaware of
what settlements had never been cleared for the Ramisi sugar factory. Thus, having
uninterruptedly occupied the since the pre-colonial era, these communities have a sense of
community land ownership. When KISCOL employees and paramilitary forces came to evict the
people living in such areas, the community felt that the land did not belong to the state and could
not be leased to the sugar factory. Therefore, they believed their land was being taken for use by
those with political power when, in reality, the sugar factory had a legitimate lease (Ruga).

The Fire:
After the recent fire at the KISCOL plantation, coast police boss, Aggrey Adoli, Coast
Province PC, Ernest Munyi, and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) boss,Ambrose
Munyasia, gathered with KISCOL’s top managers. Although their comments on the issue have
not been released, it became clear that politicians were keeping a close watch on the proceedings
following the arrest of community leaders (Otieno). During an interview with Mr. Ngozi on
November 22, the interviewee received a phone call from a source unknown to the interviewer.
In this conversation, the caller informed Mr. Ngozi that bail had been paid for the three suspects,
after which Mr. Ngozi inquired as to where the money came from. It is well-known that no local
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villagers can afford a Ksh2 million bond per suspect. Thus, whoever had paid the bail for the
three suspects was clearly someone with power and money but not in line with the political
objectives (Chimweri).

The CSOs
When land issued started to inspire grievances amongst the Msambweni community,
CSOs began representing the community and their grievances. At the beginning, Kwale Human
Rights Network (KHRN) led this initiative. KHRN quickly found that the community was
confused and unsure about the details of their situation. There were no mechanisms in place to
fill the lack of civic education regarding land rights and government activities affecting the
community. KHRN took on the task of creating such mechanisms to encourage community
awareness and participation. Thus, the Msambweni Human Rights Watch (MHRW) was
established, holding regular forums to inform community representatives who were then
responsible for disseminating the information to the larger public. In addition to gaining support
of the nationally operative Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), CSOs from the Coast
Province, including Ilishe Trust and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), began providing
support for the forums through KHRN (Jaramba, 11 Nov. 2011).

Civic Action:
Often, community members would openly admit to not understanding their rights. Thus,
forums aimed to inform the community of their rights in a government that constantly took sides
with investors. The CSOs leading the forums are responsible for training the community on
what rights they have and the ways that they can be asserted. This information comes mainly
from Kenya’s New Constitution of 2010, emphasizing the new land policy and bill of rights.
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CSOs and community members can then hold the Government of Kenya up to the provisions in
the new constitution through lobbying and advocacy (Chirema).
In reference to the Msambweni community’s battle against KISCOL, MHRW and KHRN
have shown the community members the policies that state rights to a fair compensation.
Additionally, the community has learned of its right to participation. The Government’s failure
to inform the community of its dealings with KISCOL violated the community’s right to
participation by being excluded from such decisions. Through such exclusion, it becomes easy
for the individuals in government and investors to profit without community resistance
(Chirema).
CSOs must also represent the community’s interest by providing the legal expertise and
financial support to bring the community’s contentious issues to court. When the Msambweni
community learned that their rights had been violated, KHRN supported the community in filing
a court order to restrain company management and government representatives and to stop all
KISCOL operations. With KHRN’s support, the court order was reviewed and approved, but,
unfortunately, the provisions of the court order were never enforced because KHRN lack power
to hold the Government and company responsible for the court order’s provisions (Barroh).
CSOs are also responsible for opening a space for dialog and negotiations between the
involved actors. As community members continue to resist KISCOL, CSOs must attempt to
refrain from taking sides as much as possible. Establishing an objective point of view as a thirdparty actor is crucial to hold fair and just negotiations. If MHRW and KHRN maintain an
objective stance, KISCOL and government actors will be more willing to come to roundtable
discussions with community representatives. Although there have not been any roundtable
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discussions thus far, KHRN and MHRW continue to work towards such negotiations in hopes of
creating a space for the community’s sentiments to be heard (Jaramba, 21 Nov. 2011).
In an interview on November 21 with KHRN Assistant Secretary, George Jaramba, the
interviewee shared how CSOs’ support for the community’s battle against KISCOL has changed
since the company first came to Msambweni in 2007. At the beginning, CSO representatives,
including Mr. Jaramba, were involved in protests against KISCOL, claiming that the community
was illegally evicted and their human rights were violated. However, since meeting with
KISCOL managers from the company’s headquarters in Nairobi, Mr. Jaramba vowed to never
participate in such protest again. In his meeting with the company, Mr. Jaramba discovered that
the Government was responsible for distributing land and resettling the communities. Thus, the
Government was to blame for the unprocedural and problematic manner in which the
resettlement process was conducted. After this meeting, Mr. Jaramba wrote a report of his
findings, concluding that KHRN and other CSOs involved in the battle against KISCOL must
remain objective in order to create a space for negotiations so that all actors can come to a
compromise.

The Fire:
Although CSOs like KHRN had been trying to bring about such roundtable negotiations,
currently, they are focusing on supporting the three arrested community leaders with the legal
expertise, defending them against the PC’s and Provincial Administration’s allegations. Mr.
Barroh made constant visits to the Diani Police Station after Mzee Suleman Bakari Shauri was
arrested, in efforts to ensure that Mzee’s human rights were being upheld (Barroh). KHRN and
MHRN with additional assistance from MUHURI will be defending the three suspects in the
trials that will begin on December 7th (Chimweri). Like the local community, these CSOs deny
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that there is any “mystery” to the fire (Otieno). Instead, they claim that the fire was part of a
strategic plan to consume the attention of CSOs who will be unable to allocate resources to both
defend the suspects and enforce the court order (Chimweri).
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The Problems
With such problematic discrepancies in perspective, there are many challenges that
complicate the case of KISCOL in Msambweni district. These challenges deal with resettlement,
employment, communication,and corruption, amongst other issues.

Resettlement
Land, as the single most crucial resource, causes many sensitive issues related to its high
value, enormous potential, and necessity for livelihood. Since the colonial administration
established the Land Titles Act of 1908, there has been a disregard of customary land ownership
in Kenya. Powerful individuals gained control of Kenya’s most productive land, creating a
continuum of deprivation for indigenous people who lost their valued ancestral land. Thus, as a
few individuals continued to grablarge tracts of land, a majority of the Coast Province’s
population became landless squatters (Jama).
Since the colonial era, new policies have been put in place, claiming to reestablish the
rights of the indigenous people. The National Land Policy of 2009 is one of the recent and
crucial policies for Kenya’s landless citizens. The right of squatters to be resettled through
“appropriate mechanisms” is outlined in section 3.6.9 of this policy. In the case that a piece of
land, occupied by squatters, comes under the ownership of a non-absent, private owner, the
squatters are to be resettled based on internationally approved guidelines. It is the Government’s
role and responsibility to facilitate in the negotiations between squatters and private land owners,
resettling squatters on land that is proper for human settlement.
While government agencies report that they providedthe adequate provisions for
resettling the community, located on the land leased to KISCOL, a large majority of the
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community continues to fall into the category of landless squatters. The government reports that
it has allocated each squatter household 5.5 acres of land to settle and farm for sustenance and
profit; however, this process left out a variety of crucial factors. Furthermore, most farmers
continue to deny that any resettlement plan was ever undertaken by the Government. The few
who have mentioned the resettlement do so to discuss its problematic implementation.
The government resettlement scheme was unfit for a variety of reasons. For one, many
community members lived separately from their farm lands. The household of such people lay
outside of the land included in KISCOL’s lease, so, when the Government identified the
squatters who were to be compensated, these people did not qualify for a letter of allotment. All
of the individuals interviewed in Bodo village fell into this category. Because they lived and
continue to live in houses that are located beyond the boundaries of KISCOL’s lease, they have
been evicted from their mashamba without being allocated another land for their farm. Thus,
these individuals were not compensated when they lost their means to an economic activity that
could support them and their families.
Another problem with the government’s resettlement scheme was the cost of processing a
letter of allotment. Letters of allotment must be processed within 90 days in order to become a
land title deed. Processing requires fees of Ksh10,500, an amount that is difficult for landless
farmers to scrape together on short notice. To make matters worse, kitu kidogo17 is often
necessary in order to have the letter of allotment processed before its expiration (Jaramba 21
Nov. 2011).
When President Kibaki announced the revival of the Ramisi sugar factory, he claimed
that the Ksh10,500 processing fee would be waived for squatters given letters of allotment
17

Kitu Kidogo is Kiswahili for “something small;” however in everyday conversation, the phrase
is used to refer to bribes.
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(President Kibaki opens Mombasa show, announces the revival of Ramisi sugar factory).

Whether or not these fees were actually waived is unclear; however, the fact that farmers have
cited the processing fee as an obstacle to their acquisition of title deeds shows that the
Government failed to communicate the message properly to the community.
The third issue with the government resettlement scheme was the location of the land set
aside for resettlement. Because the allocated land was located in distant villages, farmers and
their families refused to move because it would disrupt their cultural identity and social
networks. For this reason, farmers who received letters of allotment commonly sold them for
low prices and chose to stay in villages, neighboring their repossessed ancestral land (Ruga).
Lastly, some of the farmers who were given letters of allotment went to visit
thedesignated land only to find people were already living on there as squatters. This problem
was caused by Government’s failure to physically visit the land when deciding how each piece
of land was to be used. Instead of providing the squatters with land, the Government was
creating even more displacement of landless squatters (Chimweri).

Employment
The Government of Kenya and KISCOL commonly highlight the employment
opportunities that have and will become available to the local community in Msambweni. The
company reports that first priority is given to the local community members, especially
individuals who have been personally affected by land evictions (Chebosi). Yet, for the local
community, the prospect of company employment is all but lauded.
Firstly, many community members are opposed to KISCOL’s operations. Thus, working
for the company would morally compromise their values and disempower their fight against the
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company and Government. Secondly, many of the local farmers who lost their source of income
when they were evicted from their mashamba claim that they have not been informed of
KISCOL’s employment opportunities. Furthermore, other community members cite the low pay
and poor labor conditions as reasons to avoid KISCOL employment, for Ksh170 does little to
support their families’ daily needs and, thus, is not worth working for twelve hours a day, six
days a week (Chimweri).
On a related note, the opportunity to be employed by KISCOL as an outgrower remains
optimal yet elusive. Even though many farmers consider becoming an outgrower as the best
option in creating a coexistent relationship between the company and community, it is uncertain
whether or not this option will be realized in an ideal manner. The requirements of outgrowers
to show a title deed and live within a 40 kilometer radius of the factory make it difficult for the
evicted farmers to qualify.
Additionally, there are logistical problems that pertain to the outgrowing business model.
It is common for companies to fail to collect and transport the sugar cane to the factory on time,
to make late payment to farmers who have delivered their products to the factory, and to leave
outgrower crops unprocessed and unutilized due to factory back-up. Most importantly, in an
outgrowing contract, the company will be in a position to take advantage of local farmers who
are unable to effectively negotiate prices (Wanyande).

Communication
Kenya’s National Land Policy of 2009 outlines a variety of mechanisms for guaranteeing
community education and participation. In section 3.6.4, Land Issues Peculiar to Coast Region,
the policy calls for government agencies to develop a framework for consulting and informing
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indigenous land occupants before settlement schemes or land projects commence. Additionally,
the policy requires that the local communities be sensitized to their land rights and educated on
the responsibilities of land administration and management. In a section on vulnerable groups,
the National Land Policy calls for the participation of subsistence farmers and agricultural
laborers in the decisions made regarding the land and its resources. Such participation is
necessary in order to lower impact and unintended consequences.
However, even with these policies in place and included in Kenya’s new constitutional
framework, they have yet to be fully realized. In the case of KISCOL in Msambweni, there has
been a devastating lack of stakeholder participation. Community members expressed that the
Government and company has failed to communicate with the public. Thus, the community is
left uninformed about both their rights and the decisions that have such great impact on their
lives. Without information, the community will always feel marginalized by both the company
and Government, perceiving their lack of information as a lack of rights. A community that is
uninformed benefits government agencies, looking to avoid community resistance. This also
makes it easy for individual politicians to personally gain from decisions that affect the larger
public.
Thus, CSOs take on communication and education responsibilities, informing the public
of their legal rights and sharing the facts about events that affect the community. KHRN and
MHRW have been leading such efforts for the Msambweni community. They have also been
responsible for communicating and lobbying to Government and company actors on behalf of
the community. Therefore, any chance that the community has of communication, education,
participation, or negotiation relies upon the involvement of CSOs. And, with limited funding
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and personnel, such a large task may not always be fully realized even through CSOs’ best
efforts.

Corruption
In Kenya, reports of corruption constantly occupy newspaper headlines18. Corruption can
be found on every level, from the high ranking political elite to the local traffic officer. In all
cases, those with political power are looking to gain something from their advantageous
positions. Because of this unfortunate situation, the people of Kenya are in great need of leaders
who have the public’s best interest rather than personal gain in mind.
Because of Kenya’s rampant corruption, the public has become rightfully skeptical of all
political dealings. Even though there has been no confirmed evidence of corruption in the
government dealings with KISCOL, community members commonly cite corruption as the
source of many of the problems they currently face. Whether or not any corruption allegations
are sound, the frequency of corruption claims demonstrates the distrust that the community has
in the current government structures.
When interviewees were asked about the Government’s role in their battle against
KISCOL, they were quick to point to local leaders. Their reports featured village chairmen,
elders, and chiefs who sided with the company for kitu kidogo, taking advantage of their
respected positions to manipulate the public. Some community members told stories of such
local leaders going through their communities, collecting everyone’s identification cards and
Ksh50, and claiming that the items would be used to process their land titles. The community
members later found out that, by giving local leaders these items, they had actually been handing
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over their rights to their land. Additionally, the use of GSU and police forces in the eviction of
the local community convinces them that these forces were bribed to inflict harm upon the local
community. Stories of corruption and manipulation cause the community to feel that they have
been put into a situation that is “worse than colonialism,” as the Government continues to make
promises that bring only false hope (Chimweri).
Today, the community continues to view corruption as the cause of their worsening
situation. The community believes that the Government is trying to manipulate their battle
against KISCOL by arresting and persecuting three community leaders. The three arson suspects
claim to have been framed by the Government which was attempting to put out the community
opposition to KISCOL’s progress (Chimweri).
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Recommendations
In order to address these contentious problems, a number of structural mechanisms must
be established and enforced. Many of such mechanisms have already been outlined in both the
National Land Policy of 2009 and Kenya’s Constitution; however, as this case study of KISCOL
demonstrates, there has not been any follow through on these policies.
Firstly, government transparency is crucial to moving forward. No improvements will be
made if the public continues to lack trust in government structures and agencies. Government
agencies, such as Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), must be thoroughly reviewed to
implement safeguards against corruption on every level. This initiative must be led by good
leaders who will set a moral example and establish a standard of honesty and integrity.
Secondly, more support and resources must be given to the CSOs, the only actors
representing local communities. Local communities lack the experience, expertise, and funds to
assert their rights and effect a change. They depend on CSOs for a chance to stand up to
powerful corporate and government actors. Although CSOs are effective, they are limited by
donor funding and, therefore, inefficient. Through increased support of CSOs, the relationship
between all actors will improve.
Finally, civic education and engagement are greatly needed. Government agencies have
yet to act upon the legal requirements of community participation, referred to multiple times in
recent policies. With an effective framework for committees and programs that inform the
community many issues can be solved through the active exchange of information, ideas, and
resolutions.
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Conclusion
This comparison of perspectives depicts the current situation of KISCOL in Msambweni
District. Views on resettlement, employment, communication, and corruption are inconsistent
between the company, the community, the Government, and CSOs, creating contradictions that
cause the problems at the source of the conflict.Without improved mechanisms that inform the
public and bring all actors to roundtable discussions, there will be no cooperation between the
community and KISCOL. The way to a future of coexistence requires that all actors make some
sacrifices in order to balance the benefits equally and fairly. Although KISCOL’s revival has
had social and economic effects on the local community, it is not too late to stop this trend of
destruction. Through good leadership and implementation of current policies it will be possible
for the community to enjoy the benefits of KISCOL’s development promises.
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Limitations
Conducting research on a rural community meant living in a rural community. This
brought about a lack of access to information and contacts and unfamiliarity with language and
area. Because there was neither electricity nor internet access, it was difficult to obtain details
about the new information that would arise in interviews. Also, it was challenging to establish
new contacts when the previous ones had been exhausted.
To address problems with the unfamiliar language and setting, a research assistant from
the area was necessary. Although this paper would not have been possible without a translator,
there was a lot of crucial information lost in translation. Sometimes, when sitting amongst local
people who were speaking in Kiswahili or Kidigo, their conversations were about KISCOL.
This information could have benefitted this study, yet these conversations were not translated.
Additionally, depending on a guide also meant depending on the guide to be on time and
focused.
A major limitation of this paper was time. For one, this study began with a focus on
another case of a multinational corporation, BASE Titanium Ltd. who is also involved in
Msambweni and causing similar problems as KISCOL. The first week was spent establishing a
background of BASE Titanium Ltd.’s history in Kenya. Although this topic was equally as
compelling, when speaking to the people on-the-ground in Msambweni, there was an
overwhelming desire amongst community members to talk about KISCOL instead. It seemed
the community of Msambweni was in greater need to share their experiences with KISCOL.
This proved to be a great learning experience in field research, demonstrating that it is difficult to
know what to expect until getting out into field. Unfortunately, it also meant that a quarter of the
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time for this research was spent on pursuing information that did not directly contribute to this
final report.
Additionally, the time limitation prevented a truly comprehensive understanding of this
topic. Every interviewee shared new information that could have easily been the focus of a
research paper itself. For example, tribalism was commonly mentioned in interviews; however,
this paper does not include any analysis or conclusions regarding tribalism in order to prevent
jumping to conclusions from a shallow understanding of Kenya’s tribal background. Therefore,
this paper gives an overview without going deeply into analyzing any one issue in particular.
There is more breath to this paper than depth, leaving great possibilities for further study.
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Recommendations for Further Study
Due to the time limitations of this paper, there are many sections of this paper that could
be further analyzed. One area to look into is the social and cultural impact on local communities
that have been evicted from their homeland because of KISCOL’s plantation. Another area that
could be further expanded is the tribal aspect which affects both employment and corruption.
Lastly, this study could be advanced as a case study of CSOs, analyzing the effectiveness of their
current methods and providing a framework for improvements.
Because this case is an ongoing conflict, any researcher interested in the topic has the
opportunity to follow future events. The trial for the three suspected arsonists will not begin
until after this paper is submitted. Also, KISCOL will soon begin the construction of its three-inone factory and plans to begin processing sugar cane by late 2012. Once KISCOL begins selling
its products and making revenues, this study could be repeated to determine whether or not
promises of community development are realized.
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Mombasa, Kenya.
Jaramba, George. Personal interview. 21 Nov. 2011. Mr. Jaramba is the Assistant Secretary for
Kwale Human Rights Network. This interview took place at a local restaurant in
Ukunda, Kenya.
KISCOL Employee from Bodo Village. Personal interview. 16 Nov. 2011. This woman is an
employee of KISCOL who has lived in Bodo Village since birth. She has asked to be left
unnamed; however, she gave her mother’s name, Mwatime. The interview took place
outside of a local restaurant in Bodo.
KISCOL Employee from Bodo Village. Personal interview. 22 Nov. 2011. This woman is an
employee of KISCOL who was born in Bodo Village. She has asked to be left unnamed;
however, she offered her mother’s name, Mwatime. The interview took place outside of
a local restaurant in Bodo.
Malumbo, Ali Mohamed. Personal interview. 16 Nov. 2011.Mr. Malumbo is a middle-aged man
who has lived in Bodo Village for 20 years. The interview took place outside of his
home in Bodo.
Patrick. Personal Interview. 23 Nov. 2011. Patrick is a manager at KISCOL’s offices in Ramisi.
He began working with KISCOL three months prior to the interview after moving to
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Kenya from Mauritius. This informal interview took place at KISCOL’s offices in
Ramisi.
Msambweni Community Representatives. Forum discussion. 14 Nov. 2011. This forum was
held at Vingujini Primary School in Msambweni District. The forum was hosted by
Kwale Human Rights Network and Msambweni Human Rights Watch. An estimated 20
male and 20 female community representatives were present.
Mwikamba, Mwambi. Personal interview. 10 Nov. 2011. Mr. Mwikamba is a Project Officer for
Coast Rights Forum. This interview took place at Coast Rights Forum offices in
Mombasa, Kenya.
Ng’nzi, Omari Hamisi. Personal interview. 16 Nov. 2011. Mr. Ng’nzi is an elderly man who has
lived in Bodo Village for 20 years. This interview took place at Mr. Ng’nzi’s house in
Bodo.
Ngozi, Abdallah. Personal interview. 22 Nov. 2011. Mr. Ngozi is a former Member of
Parliament for Msambweni district, serving from 2003-07. The interview took place at
Mr. Ngozi’s Gonja Southern Comfort Motel in Lunga-Lunga, Kenya.
Ruga, Mshenga. Personal interview. 24 Nov. 2011.Born in Bodo Village, Mr. Ruga is a current
Counselor for Kwale County. This interview took place at Mr. Ruga’s home in Bodo.
Salim, Mwanarusi. Personal interview. 16 Nov. 2011. Mrs. Salim is an elderly woman who has
lived in Bodo Village for 40 years. This interview took place outside of her house in
Bodo.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Sections from theNational Land Policy of 2009
Section 3.6.4 Land Issues Peculiar to Coast Region
184. The land question within the Coast region is complex due to its peculiar historical and legal
origins. The processes of land adjudication and registration under the Land Titles Act (Cap 282)
deprive many members of the indigenous Coastal Communities of their land. This led to the
area having the largest single concentration of landless indigenous people living as squatters. It
also gave rise to the problem of absentee landowners. There is also a need to regulate the rights
of land owners and tenants in the context of the prevalent practice of “tenancies-at-will” and
good planning practice.
185. The slow land adjudication process and delay in finalization of settlement programmes
have denied the communities secure access to land.
186. The grant of freehold and leasehold tenure on beaches has hampered public access,
movement along the beaches and fishing.
187. The ownership of beaches and some islands within the Indian Ocean by foreigners also
poses a threat to national security.
188. Salt mining along the coast has not been rationalized with other land uses. As a result, salt
harvesting companies have acquired large tracts of land suitable for agricultural production but
which they have left idle. The coastal region hosts unique and strategic government institutions
which include the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), the Kenya Navy Base (KNB) and the Kenya
Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KEMFRI). Some of the land owned by these
institutions has, however, been allocated to private developers without due consideration of the
future development plans of the institutions.
189. Private developments along and around navigation beacons, ship leading lights and other
control points have negatively affected the maintenance of these installations.
190. The KPA has in the past reclaimed land from the sea for specific public uses. However,
some of the land reclaimed by KPA has been allocated to private developers without due
considerations for the intended use, or security of the port facilities. Increasingly private
developers have also engaged in land reclamation without authority.
191. The Tana and Sabaki rivers have their deltas in the coastal regions of Kipini and Malindi
respectively. These deltas are Kenya’s key oceanic ecosystems and important wetlands housing
unique varieties of mangrove trees among other life species. In spite of their ecological
importance, speculative land allocation, inappropriate land uses as well as inadequate
conservation measures are rampant.
192. Lamu Island is a famous World Heritage Site. Unfortunately current land use and
ownership practices are undermining the sustainability of the heritage. In addition, land
transactions are now taking place on the island with the result that many local inhabitants are
rendered landless.
193. To address the Coastal land problems, the Government shall:
(a) Establish suitable legal and administrative mechanisms to address historical claims
arising from the application of the Land Titles Act (Cap 282) of 1908;
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(b) Take an inventory of all government land long the ’10 milecoastal strip’ and other
parts of the province where the problem of squatters is prevalent and come up with a
framework for conversion to community land for eventual adjudication and resettlement;
(c) Provide a legal framework to protect the tenants at will;
(d) Establish convenient public utility plots long the coastline to serve as landing sites
and for public recreation, and open up all public access roads to the beach;
(e) Regulate the construction of walls along the high water mark;
(f) Provide a framework for beach management and the protection, conservation, and
management of land that has been created through natural recession of the sea or through
reclamation from the sea;
(g) Establish a framework for consulting indigenous occupants of land before
establishing settlement schemes and other land use projects;
(h) Protect and conserve the Tana and Sabaki Delta ecosystems in collaboration with
contiguous communities;
(i) Sensitize and educate people on their land rights and land administration and
management procedures;
(j) Provide a framework for sharing benefits from land and land based resources with
communities;
(k) Initiate and support the preparation of an integrated coast resource management plan;
(l) Regulate ownership and use of islands by foreigners taking into account public policy
considerations such as national security;
(m) Rationalize salt mining with other land uses; and
(n) Establish mechanisms to regulate all forms of disposal of strategic public institutional
land to take into account the future development plans and needs of these institutions.

3.6.5 Land Rights of Vulnerable Groups
194. Vulnerability is a manifestation of poverty and deprivation. It takes forms such as lack of
adequate shelter, illiteracy, exposure to ill treatment, lack of power to influence decisions
affecting one’s life, and disabilities. The most vulnerable persons in Kenya include; subsistence
farmers, pastoralists, hunters and gatherers, agricultural labourers, unskilled and low-skilled
workers, unemployed youth, persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV and AIDS,
orphans, slum and street dwellers, and the aged.
195. Poor and vulnerable people lack voice, power, and representation in society, which limits
their opportunities to access, use and own land and land based resources.
196. The land rights of vulnerable individuals and groups are not adequately protected and are
subject to bias and discrimination. Further, the vulnerable lack cohesive institutions to represent
their interests.
197. To secure access to land and land based resources for vulnerable groups, the Government
shall:
(a) Develop mechanisms for identifying, monitoring and assessing the vulnerable
groups;
(b) Establish mechanisms for redistribution of land and resettlement;
(c) Facilitate their participation in decision making over land and land based resources;
and
(d) Protect their land rights from unjust and illegal expropriation.
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3.6.9 Informal Settlements
209. The essence of ‘informal’ or ‘spontaneous’ or ‘squatter’ settlements is the absence of
security of tenure and planning. Many Kenyans live as squatters, in slums and other squalid
places. Squatters and informal settlements therefore present a challenge for land planning and
development.
210. Squatters are found on all categories of land.
211. To deal with the challenges presented by squatters and informal settlements, the
Government shall:
(a) Take an inventory of genuine squatters and people who live in informal settlements;
(b) Determine whether land occupied by squatters is suitable for human settlement;
(c) Establish appropriate mechanisms for the removal of squatters from unsuitable land
and their resettlement;
(d) Facilitate planning of land found to be suitable for human settlement;
(e) Ensure that land subject to informal settlement is developed in an ordered and
sustainable manner;
(f) Facilitate negotiations between private owners and squatters in cases of squatter
settlements found on private land;
(g) Facilitate the regularization of existing squatter settlements found on public and
community land for purposes of upgrading or development;
(h) Establish a legal framework and procedures for transferring unutilized land and land
belonging to absentee land owners to squatters and people living in informal settlements;
(i) Develop, in consultation with affected communities, a slum upgrading and
resettlement programme under specific flexible tenure systems;
(j) Put in place measures to prevent further slum development;
(k) Facilitate the carrying out of informal commercial activities in a planned manner;
(l) Regulate the disposal of land allocated to squatters and informal settlers; and
(m) Establish an appropriate legal framework for eviction based on internationally
acceptable guidelines.
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Appendix B: Kenya District Map
Msambweni District is located at the southeastern most point of Kenya.

"Kenya District Map." Map. Uwezo. WERK, 21 July 2011. Web. 30 Nov. 2011.
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Appendix C: Pictures

KISCOL Employees Planting Sugar Cane Stock

Laying Sub-Surface Drip Irrigation System

Fully Matured KISCOL Sugar Cane in Gonjora

Karamoja Dam
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KISCOL Sugar Cane Field in Bodo Village

Typical Village Home in Msambweni

Eight Acres of Burnt Sugar Cane in Gonjora

Mr. Ngozi’s Gonja Southern Comfort Motel
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ISP Review Sheet
Topic
My ISP was a case study of Kwale International Sugar Co. Ltd. It was conducted by
speaking to various people who are involved with, connected to, and affected by the company’s
activities in Msambweni District of Kwale County.

Location of Field Study
The field work for this study was conducted in Msambweni. I stayed with a family
(Mama Nenani) in Bodo Village. Ali Shariff helped me to make contact with Thabiti (South
Coast SIT Coordinator- 0726 088389) who arranged the home stay.
Going to stay in the village to conduct field research was necessary for this project. It
was really easy to meet with contacts so long as I was able to travel to where they were.
Although I was only in Msambweni for eight days, each day was extremely busy and productive.
While in Mombasa for archival research and writing, I stayed with the same host family
(Mama Tahiya) from the FSS seminar period. Not having to think about laundry or food made it
easier to focus on my paper, and having a family to go home to at the end of every day was
something I always looked forward to.

Nuts And Bolts
While staying in Bodo Village, I used a water filter that I had brought with me from
America. Also, there were many more mosquitoes than Mombasa, but my host family provided
a mosquito net. There was no electricity, making it difficult to keep up with all of my notes and
contacts.

Other Noteworthy Comments
Don’t expect everything to go according to plan. This paper originally focused on
mining companies in Msambweni; however, I found the case of KISCOL to be more interesting
once I got there. I spent a lot of time trying to figure out how I could include both mining and
KISCOL until I finally realized that it was better to just pursue one in greater depth.
Also, I quickly discovered that the best way to arrange interviews was to call any possible
contacts and ask them where and when they could meet with me. It was easier to call and set up
interviews while I was in the village rather than trying to create a schedule of interviews before
arriving in Msambweni.
Lastly, staying with a host family in both Mombasa and Msambweni helped me to realize
that the ISP period is not only about research, but also about making a home here in Kenya.
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